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NOTES
ANTITRUST-Professions-Per Se Rule Applied to
Ethical Canon Against Competitive Bidding. National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679 (1978). In National Society of Professional Engineers
v. United States' the Supreme Court strictly applied Section
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 2 to a learned profession. The
Court refused to provide an exemption for an ethical canon
which purported to foster professional ethics at the expense of
competition. The National Society decision gave some indica-
tion of how the Court will treat professional ethical canons
that have antitrust implications, but also raised serious ques-
tions about what types of canons are still permissible.
The case involved an ethical canon of the National Society
of Professional Engineers which prohibited competitive bid-
ding. In 1972 the United States instituted a civil antitrust ac-
tion to enjoin members of the Society from adhering to the
ethical canon.3 Similar actions had been brought against
groups of civil engineers,4 architects5 and certified public ac-
countants,' but injunctions had been entered pursuant to con-
sent decrees.7 Up until 1975 and the decision in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar8 it was unclear whether the Sherman Act
was even to apply to the professions Consequently, National
Society is one of the few cases, other than Goldfarb, which
discusses the extent to which the Sherman Act will apply to the
learned professions in the future.
1. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
2. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
3. 435 U.S. at 683 n.3.
4. United States v. American Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, 1972 TRADE CASES (CCH)
73,950 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1972).
5. United States v. American Inst. of Architects, 1972 TRADE CASES (CCH) 73,981
(D.D.C. June 19, 1972).
6. United States v. American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, Inc., 1972 TRADE
CASES (CCH) 74,007 (D.D.C. July 6, 1972).
7. See generally 48 NOTRE DAME LAw. 966 (1973).
8. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
9. See Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: The
Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rsv. 475, 475-76 n.5 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Branca & Steinberg]; Coleman, The Learned Professions, 33 A.B.A. ANrrRuST L.J.
48 (1967).
ANTITRUST
I. DEMISE OF IMMUNITY FOR THE PROFESSIONS
There are several reasons why the professions originally
were thought to be exempt from the Sherman Act. Section 1
of the Act only applies to contracts, combinations and conspir-
acies which are "in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States."10 For several years it was unclear whether pro-
fessional activities constituted "trade or commerce" within the
meaning of the Act and whether they were local in nature and
did not affect interstate commerce "among the several states."
Finally, there was a question whether state-regulated profes-
sional conduct came within the state action exemption to the
Sherman Act."
A. "Trade or Commerce"
The uncertainty surrounding the application of the Sher-
man Act to the professions began with the case of Federal
Baseball Club v. National League. 2 In that case Justice
Holmes stated that, "[P]ersonal effort, not related to produc-
tion, is not a subject of commerce,"' 3 and that the exhibition
of baseball games "although made for money would not be
called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of
those words."" He cited to the legal profession as an example
of "[t]hat which in its consummation is not commerce."' 5
Thus, the decision seemed to suggest that any rendition of
services "not related to production" would not constitute
"trade or commerce" covered by the Sherman Act."
Although a more expansive definition of the word "trade"
was subsequently adopted, the Supreme Court was reluctant
to include the learned professions within the provisions of the
Sherman Act. For example, in applying the Sherman Act to a
cleaning business in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States,'7 the Supreme Court stated that, "'Wherever any occu-
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
11. See Bauer, Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAM
LAw. 570, 570-71 (1974-1975) [hereinafter cited as Bauer].
12. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
13. Id. at 209.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Bauer, supra note 11, at 573. Cf. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931)
(decided under the Federal Trade Commission Act) (noting that doctors are not in
competition with drug manufacturers because, "They follow a profession and not a
trade"). See Bauer, supra note 11, at 574.
17. 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
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pation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose
of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in
the learned professions, it is constantly called a trade.' 18 Sim-
ilarly, in United States v. National Association of Real Estate
Boards'9 the Court included real estate brokerage within the
same broad definition of "trade," but explicitly declined to
comment on the application of antitrust laws to professions.'
In the interim between Atlantic Cleaners and Real Estate
Boards, the Supreme Court had indicated a significant shift in
its approach to the professions and the Sherman Act. In
American Medical Association v. United States2' the Court
held that the Association could not prevent individual doctors
from working on a salaried basis for a corporation providing
medical services. Although the Court did not decide whether
the medical profession was a "trade," it did find that any pur-
ported exemption of professions did not apply where the object
of the restraint was engaged in "commerce." 22 Since that time
the lower federal and state court decisions have offered no fur-
ther help in deciding whether the professions are exempt from
the Sherman Act.?
It was not until Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar2 1 that the
Supreme Court finally decided that the professions did consti-
tute "trade or commerce" within the meaning of that phrase
in Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Holding that bar association
fee schedules did violate the Act, the Court noted that "the
examination of a land title is a service; the exchange of such a
service for money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of
that word. '"2
Rejecting any notion of a professional exemption, the Court
stated that, "We cannot find support for the proposition that
Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion. The nature of
an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from
the Sherman Act . .. ",28 Thus, Goldfarb eliminated any
18. Id. at 436 (quoting The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506, 507 (C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No.
10,388)) (emphasis in original).
19. 339 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1950).
20. Id. at 490-92.
21. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
22. Id. at 529.
23. See Bauer, supra note 11, at 578-84.
24. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
25. Id. at 787-88.
26. Id. at 787 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1949) (which
dealt with a joint venture of several newspaper companies)).
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doubt that the professions constituted "trade or commerce"
covered by the Sherman Act.
B. "Among the Several States"
The issue of whether or not the professions involved trade
or commerce "among the states" underwent a similar history.
In his opinion in Federal Baseball mentioned earlier, Justice
Holmes noted that interstate travel does not transform activity
not covered by the Sherman Act into "commerce." By way of
illustration, he specifically referred to the legal profession, say-
ing that, "A firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a
case . . .does not engage in such [interstate] commerce be-
cause the lawyer. . . goes to another State." Thus, the Court
seemed to indicate that professions in general, and the legal
profession in particular, were not subject to the Sherman Act,
not only because they were not engaged in "trade or com-
merce," but also because the activities they engaged in were
not interstate in character.
However, since the Federal Baseball decision, the Supreme
Court has greatly expanded the meaning of the term
"interstate commerce. ' ' 2 The Court now applies the Sherman
Act both to activity actually in interstate commerce and to
activity which substantially affects interstate commerce. 2 This
includes nearly all of the activities of professional groups organ-
ized on a national basis."'
The minimum fee schedule of the Virginia State Bar in
Goldfarb was found to have sufficient effect on interstate com-
merce to warrant coverage under the Sherman Act. However,
the Court did suggest that "there may be legal services that
have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus are beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act."'31 Although it is theoretically
possible that an anticompetitive ethical canon might be per-
mitted to stand because it dealt solely with intrastate activi-
ties, in practice such a canon would have little utility in light
of the broad interpretation of the Sherman Act's interstate
27. 259 U.S. at 209.
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
29. See Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967). See also Bauer, supra note 11, at
595.
30. Rigler, Professional Codes of Conduct after Goldfarb: A Proposed Method of
Antitrust Analysis, 29 ARK. L. Rav. 185, 188 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rigler].
31. 421 U.S. at 785-86.
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commerce requirement. 2 In effect, Goldfarb laid to rest both
of the arguments suggested in Federal Baseball for exempting
the professions from the Sherman Act.
C. State Action
A third reason why the professions were thought to be ex-
empt from the application of the Sherman Act had its origins
in the case of Parker v. Brown.3 In that case the Supreme
Court upheld state regulation of an agricultural market on the
grounds that the Sherman Act does not apply to the actions of
states or state officials.34 Thus, it is argued in Goldfarb that
professions subject to state regulation should not be held ac-
countable under antitrust law.
However, the Goldfarb Court held that in order to be within
the state action exemption, an activity must be required, not
merely authorized, by the regulating state.35 Thus, for example,
in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona" the Supreme Court found
that the Sherman Act did not apply to a disciplinary rule
promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court which prohibited
lawyer advertising.37 However, most of the professions are not
regulated so directly by the states. Therefore, the Goldfarb
decision effectively subjected the vast majority of professional
organizations to scrutiny under the Sherman Act. However, the
decision was unclear about exactly how the Sherman Act
should apply in these cases.
II. THE PROFESSIONS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
The Goldfarb decision did not specify whether the Sherman
Act would apply to the professions in the same way it had been
applied to other business. The Court suggested that different,
less vigorous standards might apply to the professions. Under
traditional analysis the legality of various business activities is
determined under the related standards of the rule of reason
and the per se doctrine.38
32. See Branca & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 479.
33. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
34. Id. at 352.
35. 421 U.S. at 790. See also Bauer, supra note 11, at 598-601; Branca & Steinberg,
supra note 9, at 480-82; 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 699, 723-30 (1976-1977).
36. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
37. Id. at 360. However, the Supreme Court held that the Arizona disciplinary rule
violated the first amendment of the Constitution.
38. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTIRrusT 165-97 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN]; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
[Vol. 62:260
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The rule of reason was developed in response to the broad
sweep of the language in Section 1 of the Sherman Act. That
section purports to prohibit "[e]very contract, combination
• ..or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." It cannot be applied
literally; otherwise, normal contracts between buyers and sell-
ers would be illegal. 9
Consequently, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States" the
Supreme Court instituted the rule of reason, under which par-
ticular restraints of trade are held to violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act only if they restrict competition to a degree con-
sidered undue."1 The focus of the inquiry is not whether the
restraint is desirable, but whether it restricts competition un-
reasonably. The enunciation of the rule of reason in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States 1 has been widely accepted as
the definitive description of the test: "The true test of legality
is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 3
However, certain types of conduct are considered to be so
blatantly anticompetitive that they have been held to be illegal
per se. For example, pricing fixing" and the horizontal division
of markets 5 have been found to be within the per se doctrine."
No elaborate balancing of the effects on competition under the
rule of reason is needed to determine the legality of restraints
which are illegal per se.
The Goldfarb decision did not make clear exactly how those
rules would be applied to the professions. Although the Court
found the minimum fee schedules in that case to be price fixing
which is illegal per se, the Court limited its holding with the
following footnote:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as
distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in deter-
mining whether that particular restraint violates the Sher-
Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
39. National Soc'y, 435 U.S. at 688 n.10.
40. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
41. Id. at 62.
42. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
43. Id. at 238.
44. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
45. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
46. See also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group
boycotts); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements).
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man Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of pro-
fessions as interchangeable with other business activities,
and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust con-
cepts which originated in other areas. The public service as-
pect, and other features of the professions, may require that
a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated
differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than
the one with which we are confronted today. 7
This footnote gave no definite guidance because it was un-
clear. 8 Furthermore, it did not indicate whether factors other
than the impact on competition could be taken into account in
determining the legality of restraints upon the professions. It
could have meant that the per se doctrine was to give way to
the rule of reason approach in all cases where professions were
involved. It could also have meant that factors other than the
ultimate impact upon competition could be taken into consid-
eration when the rule of reason was applied to professions. In
either event a defense based on the reasonableness of the re-
straint involved might prove successful."
Consequently, in National Society the Society attempted to
justify its ethical canon prohibiting competitive bidding on
factors other than the ultimate impact of its canon on competi-
tion among professional engineers."' The Society claimed that
it was often easier and less expensive for an engineer to design
less efficient structures and specify more costly methods of
construction. Thus, it argued that, although in a given case
competitive bidding might reduce the price of engineering serv-
ices, it might also reduce the quality of those services and
increase the overall cost of the project. 5' If factors other than
the impact on competition could be considered, this argument
based on the public welfare and safety ramifications of the
ethical canon could succeed.
47. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
48. See 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 699, 721.
49. Tyler, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar: The Professions are Subject to the Sher-
man Act, 41 Mo. L. REv. 1, 11 (1976).
50. It should be noted that the Supreme Court vacated the original district court
decision against the Society, United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs,
389 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C. 1974), and remanded the case to be reconsidered in light of
Goldfarb, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975). Upon remand the district court reaffirmed its original
judgment, 404 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1975), and the court of appeals affirmed in part,
555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
51. 435 U.S. at 693 (quoting the Society's answer).
[Vol. 62:260
ANTITRUST
However, the Supreme Court rejected both the Society's
argument and the implication that factors other than the effect
of a particular restraint on competition could be considered in
determining its legality under the Sherman Act. "[T]he pur-
pose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competi-
tive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a
policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the
interest of the members of an industry. 5 2 The Court noted
that,
[T]he cautionary footnote in Goldfarb . . . cannot be read
as fashioning a broad exemption under the Rule of Reason for
learned professions. We adhere to the view expressed in
Goldfarb that, by their nature, professional services may dif-
fer significantly from other business services, and, accord-
ingly, the nature of the competition in such services may
vary. Ethical norms may serve to regulate and promote this
competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason ...
[T]he equation of competition with deception. . . is simply
too broad; we may assume that competition is not entirely
conducive to ethical behavior, but that is not a reason, cog-
nizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with competi-
tion.53
Consequently, the Court applied the traditional analysis
and held that the Society's canon against competitive bidding
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Relying on past deci-
sions dealing with nonprofessional restraints, the Court em-
phasized that "price is the 'central nervous system of the econ-
omy,' "51 and that "an agreement that 'interfere[s] with the
setting of price by free market forces' is illegal on its face."55
The Court found that, while the Society's canon was "not price
fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agree-
ment."56 Thus, the Court applied the traditional per se doctrine
to the Society's professional ethical canon, foreclosing any fur-
52. Id. at 692. But cf. id. at 700 n.* (concurring opinion) ("This Court has not
always applied the Rule of Reason with such rigor. "). See also SULLIVAN, supra
note 38, at 175-82, 186-89.
53. 435 U.S. at 696.
54. Id. at 692 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226
n.59 (1940)).
55. 435 U.S. at 692 (quoting United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337
(1969)).
56. 435 U.S. at 692.
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ther inquiry into justifications for the restraint under the rule
of reason.5 7
The Court's refusal to apply more lenient standards to the
professions is understandable. Several changes have taken
place since Federal Baseball when the Supreme Court was con-
tent to let the professions regulate themselves. For one thing
the term "professional" no longer applies solely to doctors and
lawyers. Furthermore, all of the professions have taken on more
of the attributes of business. The Goldfarb Court specifically
recognized that the legal profession has a business aspect.58
More importantly, however, the public service aspect of the
professions has become diluted in many cases.5 This latter
development is especially crucial because the theory that the
professions should be protected from competition "assumes ei-
ther that high quality of product and minimization of price are
always consistent with the economic self-interest of the special-
ist, or that in the case of conflict the specialist will unselfishly
serve the public."6 Thus, in subjecting the professions to scru-
tiny under the Sherman Act the Supreme Court may have been
merely responding to changes that have taken place within the
professions themselves.
However, perhaps the traditional competition-oriented
Sherman Act analysis is not entirely appropriate for the profes-
sions. As Justice Blackmun noted in his concurring opinion,
"there may be ethical rules which have more than de minimis
anticompetitive effect and yet are important in a profession's
proper ordering."6' For example, the imposition of minimum
standards for licensing reduces the number of available com-
petitors, but also protects the public against unqualified prac-
titioners.2 The Supreme Court itself has suggested that a pros-
cription against advertising fees for nonroutine legal services
57. The Court's reference to the Society's canon as "not price fixing as such" may
be misleading. Although it did not constitute an outright agreement to fix the price of
engineering services, the canon still fell within the broad class of agreements having
the "effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing" prices which have
been held to be illegal per se under the Sherman Act. See United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). See also SuLLvAN, supra note 38, at 198-
203.
58. 421 U.S. at 788.
59. 82 YALE L.J. 313, 333 (1972).
60. Id.
61. 435 U.S. at 700.
62. Id. at 700-01.
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might be necessary to prevent misleading consumers. 3 Thus,
Justice Blackmun concluded that a more flexible approach was
appropriate.
I would not, at least for the moment, reach as far as the Court
appears to me to do in intimating ... that any ethical rule
with an overall anticompetitive effect promulgated by a pro-
fessional society is forbidden under the Sherman Act. In my
view, the decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar. . . pro-
perly left to the Court some flexibility in considering how to
apply traditional Sherman Act concepts to professions long
consigned to self-regulation. 4
The majority certainly appeared to adopt the traditional
competition-oriented approach in applying the Sherman Act
to the profession in National Society. However, the Court
continued to distinguish between the professions and other
businesses in applying the Sherman Act. Although the Court
rigorously applied the per se rule to the Society's ethical
canon in this case, the references to the strict application of
the rule of reason were dicta. Thus, it is possible that the
Court will still display the flexibility suggested in the Goldfarb
footnote in applying the rule of reason less restrictively to the
professions.
In 1975 one authority suggested the following approach
which comports with the result reached in National Society:
In applying the rule of reason to non per se type ethical prohi-
bitions, the effect of the prohibition on the public as con-
trasted with its effect upon the economics of the profession
has emerged as an important element to be evaluated ...
Stated differently, ethical sanctions designed to protect
the public from abuses by members of the profession pre-
sumptively are reasonable, and any restraints which may be
imposed upon the profession likely will be considered reason-
ably ancillary to a legitimate purpose. Sanctions designed to
protect professionals only from each other, however, have the
effect of insulating the service market of that profession from
competition, thereby conflicting with the basic antitrust phi-
losophy that restraints on competition impose added costs of
the service on the public."5
Under this aproach an ethical rule which was not illegal per
se would be judged under a less traditional rule of reason which
63. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 372 (1977).
64. 435 U.S, at 699 (citations omitted).
65. Rigler, supra note 30, at 197-98.
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would take the interests of the public into consideration.
"Anticompetitive" canons which serve to protect the public
and not the professions would be more likely to be accepted.6
The ethical rules that were the subject of Justice Blackmun's
concern would probably fall into this category. Thus, competi-
tion within the professions would still be preserved, but not at
the expense of sacrificing the integrity of the professions.
I. CONCLUSION
Strict Sherman Act scrutiny for the professions represents
a marked shift from the presumed antitrust exemption of the
Federal Baseball era. While it is clear after Goldfarb and
National Society that no such blanket exemption exists, it is
unclear whether the Court will always apply traditional Sher-
man Act analysis to the professions. The Goldfarb opinion indi-
cated that restraints on professions might be treated differently
in some cases. However, the Court did not appear to observe
any distinction between the professions and other businesses in
National Society where the restraint on the professional was
illegal per se.
If there is to be any flexibility in the Court's application of
the Sherman Act to the professions it will probably be in its
treatment of professional restraints which are not illegal per se.
Especially in analyzing professional ethical canons which are
imposed to protect the public, the Court may be willing to
consider factors other than the impact on competition in some
cases. This approach would promote the high professional stan-
dards society deserves while preserving the competitive envi-
ronment the Sherman Act requires.
JAMES H. GORMLEY, JR.
CIVIL PROCEDURE-Right to Jury Trial-Congress In-
tended to Grant Right to Jury Trial in Actions Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575 (1978). In Lorillard v. Pons' the United States
66. Cf. Friedman v. Rogers, 47 U.S.L.W. 4151 (1979) (where the Supreme Court
upheld some state regulation of optometrists against a first amendment challenge on
the grounds that it was needed for the protection of the public).
1. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
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